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MARK OSBORNE HUMPHRIES
Abstract
Using a variety of archival sources and statistics compiled from military hos-
pital records, the author examines the origin and dissemination of influenza in
Canada during the “Spanish” influenza pandemic of 1918. He argues that pan-
demic influenza did not originate with soldiers returning from the First World
War but instead traces the spread of the virus to American soldiers on their way
overseas. The author posits that in Canada, the disease was then disseminated
by the movement of Canadian soldiers as the war effort was widened to include
a new commitment to mount an expeditionary force to Siberia. The author con-
cludes that the physical path of the 1918 influenza pandemic in Canada is best
understood as the result of a widening of the war effort at the expense of pub-
lic health rather than as the inevitable consequence of the war’s end.
Résumé
L’auteur examine ici les origines et la propagation de l’influenza au Canada
pendant la pandémie de grippe espagnole de 1918. Pour cela, il a consulté
diverses sources statistiques et archivistiques tirées de dossiers d’hôpitaux
militaires. Il avance que les vecteurs de propagation du virus n’auraient pas été
les soldats de retour de la Première Guerre mondiale, mais plutôt les soldats
américains qui se rendaient outre-mer. L’auteur pose comme postulat que la
maladie s’est par la suite propagée au Canada par l’entremise des soldats
canadiens que l’on redéployait afin de constituer une force expéditionnaire en
Sibérie. L’auteur conclut qu’en choisissant d’élargir l’effort de guerre au détri-
ment de la protection de la santé publique, le Canada a favorisé la
dissémination de la pandémie de l’influenza de 1918, qui n’aurait donc pas été
une conséquence inévitable de la fin de la guerre.
1 The author wishes to thank Terry Copp, Francine McKenzie, Robert Wardhaugh, Tim Cook,
Andrew Horrall, Adrian Ciani and Lianne Leddy. He also wishes to acknowledge the funding
and support of the Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies (LCMSDS)
at Wilfrid Laurier University. 
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INFLUENZA IS A FAMILIAR DISEASE. While usually the “flu” is little more than anannoyance to the majority of its victims, for both the oldest and youngest
members of the population it can become a matter of life and death.2 However,
several times each century, influenza becomes a more sinister disease. During
the 20th century influenza has caused a global pandemic three times: in 1918,
1957, and 1968.3 Influenza becomes pandemic, rather than epidemic, when a
significant percentage of the world’s population becomes infected with the
same strain4 of the virus at approximately the same time. Pandemic influenza
also causes a significantly higher number of deaths, both within its usual demo-
graphic range, as well as among seemingly healthy people. During the 1918-19
Pandemic it has been suggested that as many as 100,000,000 people world-
wide, and more than 50,000 in Canada alone, died from what became known as
“Spanish Influenza” or “Spanish Flu”.5 While the world death toll was likely
closer to 40 or 50 million, the majority of deaths occurred among otherwise
healthy males and females between the ages of 15 and 35.6
The 1918 virus was different from other pandemic viruses of the 20th cen-
tury in several ways. First, it killed the very people who, in theory, should have
had the best chance of overcoming the disease. As well, the virus had an astro-
nomical mortality rate. Victims contracted influenza and sometimes, in only a
matter of hours, began to turn a bluish-purple in the face (what doctors called
a “peculiar heliotrope cyanosis”) as they struggled to breathe. As the body’s
defensive systems were overwhelmed, these victims could develop a secondary
and often fatal infection of the respiratory system, usually pneumonia, which
would kill them in a matter of days. On rarer occasions, victims died of the ini-
tial influenza infection itself before a secondary disease could even begin to
take hold.7 Why the 1918 influenza virus was so deadly remains a mystery.8
2 World Health Organization, “Fact Sheet N 211: Influenza” ww.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/
fs211/en/print.html.
3 For a good overview of the history and medical aspects of the three 20th Century influenza
Pandemics see W. Graeme Laver, Norbert Bischofberger and Robert G. Webster, “The Origin and
Control of Pandemic Influenza,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 43, no. 2 (2000): 173-91.
4 Distinct “strains” of influenza are defined by the number of hemagglutinin and neuraminidase
proteins on the viral cell membrane.
5 Estimates of mortality range from 20,000,000 to in excess of 100,000,000. The most recent,
scientific estimate of mortality is 50,000,000 which are provided in the following article: Niall
P.A.S. Johnson and Juergen Mueller, “Updating Accounts: Global Mortality of the 1918-1920
“Spanish” Influenza Pandemic,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 76 (2002): 105-15. 
6 The best summary of the demographic aspects of the pandemic can be found in Ann H Reid,
Jeffery K Taubenberger and Thomas G Fanning, “The 1918 Spanish Influenza: Integrating
History and Biology” Microbes and Infection 3 (2001): 81-7.
7 Ibid.
8 While it is true that the Ministry of Agriculture administered federal government policy dealing
with health issues, the ministry was certainly ill-equipped to handle a minor healthcare crisis,
not to mention a major pandemic. The profound inadequacy of federal provisions for health is 
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Every year influenza viruses mutate. These mutations are essentially ran-
dom variations in the genetic make up of the virus which occur through the
process of antigenetic drift. As influenza viruses reproduce and multiply, a cer-
tain number of natural variations occur within the DNA/RNA sequence of the
virus that are passed on to future generations. If these genetic mutations result
in a virus with characteristics that make it better adapted to survive and repro-
duce in a human host, these genetic traits will become more prevalent in future
generations of the virus as that virus will be more successful in passing on its
genetic material.9
Most often these mutations do not alter the actual strain of influenza virus.
Therefore, although a virus will change its genetic makeup every flu season, it
remains the same basic type of influenza virus, and the body’s defensive mech-
anisms recognize it as such. This explains why influenza has a relatively low
mortality rate among the healthy, yet a high rate of morbidity (infection). Once
the immune system is able to sort through the small, seasonal variations in the
influenza virus, it can recognize the strain of the “invader” and retrieve the right
“defensive strategy.” As indicated, however, several times a century a new
strain of influenza virus emerges through antigenetic shift. The immune system
is thus unable to recognize the strain of the influenza virus and it has no exist-
ing strategy to defeat the invader. Then, not only does the virus infect the host,
but it also more frequently overwhelms the body’s defences which results in an
increased number of deaths. Whenever a new viral strain emerges that has the
ability to transmit itself efficiently within the human population, an influenza
pandemic becomes highly likely. While pandemics are natural occurrences, no
recorded pandemic has been as deadly as 1918.10
Historians and scientists believe that a particularly virulent strain of
influenza emerged during the spring of 1918.11 The historiography suggests
that the pandemic occurred in three waves throughout much of the world: the
first in the spring of 1918, the second in the fall of 1918 and the third in the
winter of 1918-1919.12 The first wave is believed to have caused few deaths
commented on in the minutes of the first meeting of the Dominion Council of Health in 1919.
Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Record Group (RG) 29, Microfilm Reel C-9814.
9 Laver, 175-6.
10 Laver, 176-8; Johnathan S Nguyen-Van-Tam, Alan W Hampson, “The Epidemiology and
Clinical Impact of Pandemic Influenza”, Vaccine 21 (2003): 1762-8.
11 Jeffery K Taubenberger, Ann H Reid, et al, “Characterization of the 1918 Influenza Virus
Hemagglutinin and Neuraminidase Genes” International Congress Series 1219 (2001): 545-9;
Ann H Reid, Thomas G Fanning, Johan V Hultin and Jeffery K Taubenberger, “Origins and
Evolution of the 1918 “Spanish” Influenza Virus Hemagglutinin Gene,” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Science of the United States of America 96 (1999): 1651-6; Ann H Reid,
et al, “1918 Influenza Pandemic Caused by Highly Conserved Viruses with Two Receptor-
Binding Variants,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 9, no. 10 (2003): 1249-53.
12 Nguyen-Van-Tam, 1763-4.
237
THE HORROR AT HOME: THE CANADIAN MILITARY AND THE “GREAT”
INFLUENZA PANDEMIC OF 1918
chajournal2005.qxd  12/29/06  8:13 AM  Page 237
and would likely have gone unnoticed were it not for the second and extremely
deadly autumn wave.13 The third wave of the disease caused a significant num-
ber of deaths, but did not begin to approach the previous wave’s astronomically
high rate of mortality.14 When and where the virus first emerged, however, is a
matter of debate amongst both virologists and historians. 
While the name “Spanish Flu” suggests that the disease first appeared on
the Iberian Peninsula, this claim is universally dismissed. Historians argue that
because Spain was not a combatant during the First World War, the uncensored
Spanish press were simply the first to publish accounts of the disease and that
the international media thereafter began to refer to it as “Influenza of the
Spanish type.” Speculation as to the origin of the disease has instead centred on
two possible locations: the trenches of the First World War and the United
States.
Virologist John Oxford suggests a European origin for the disease. Using
accounts of epidemics of “purulent bronchitis” published in medical journals
between 1915 and 1917, Oxford argues that the conditions of the First World
War provided a unique environment from which pandemic influenza could
emerge:
The unprecedented circumstances of 1916-1918 – in particular the war on the
Western Front, a landscape that was contaminated with respiratory irritants
such as chlorine and phosgene, and characterized by stress and overcrowding,
the partial starvation of civilians, and the opportunity for rapid “passage” of
influenza in young soldiers would have provided the opportunity for multiple
but small mutational changes throughout the viral genome. Such factors could
have been important factors in the evolution of the virus into a particularly vir-
ulent form, resulting in a pandemic.15
He posits that the disease first appeared in France and England before 1918 but
was unable to transmit itself efficiently outside of the optimum conditions pro-
vided by hospitals, the trenches and training camps. According to Oxford, by
the early spring of 1918 the disease became more virulent and began to spread
across Europe, eventually reaching North America.16
Other virologists and historians, using public health reports, newspaper
accounts and medical journals, claim that the virus actually originated in
Kansas in the early spring of 1918. Rod Daniels suggests that “The first case
[of Spanish Influenza] can be traced to Camp Funston, Kansas, USA on 8
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 J.S. Oxford, et al, “World War I May Have Allowed the Emergence of ‘Spanish’ Influenza,”
The Lancet: Infectious Diseases 2, February (2002): 113.
16 J.S. Oxford, et al, “Early Herald Wave Outbreaks of Influenza in 1916 Prior to the Pandemic
of 1918,” International Congress Series 1219 (2001): 155-61.
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March 1918. This heralded the start of the pandemic which spread around the
world in three waves.”17 Historian John Barry, author of The Great Influenza,
suggests an even earlier American origin for the 1918 virus, arguing that the
first cases appeared among civilians at Haskell, Kansas in February 1918.18
Canadian historians generally agree that the disease had a European origin
and was brought to Canada by soldiers returning from the First World War. The
first Canadian historian to write about the disease was Sir Andrew Macphail in
the Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-1919:
Medical Services. While MacPhail was the first to argue that the disease arrived
in Canada with soldiers returning from the war, his evidentiary basis was
unclear.19 The most important account of how the Spanish Flu arrived in
Canada is thus Janice P. Dickin McGinnis’ “The Impact of Epidemic Influenza:
Canada, 1918-19”.20
Dickin McGinnis posits that the Spanish Flu resulted from the end of the
Great War. She writes: “after the cessation of hostilities armies are sent home
to spread unfamiliar, and perhaps even brand new, forms of sickness among a
population likely suffering from some extent of privation due to war. In Europe
during the nineteenth century and earlier the end result was usually typhus.
After World War I, it was ‘Spanish Influenza.’”21 Using archival records,
Dickin McGinnis traces the arrival of the virus in Canada to four troop ships:
The Araguyan left England 26 June and developed 175 cases among 763 sol-
diers on board. The first incident in which civilian officials took part involved
the steamship Somali which had been granted pratique when it stopped in at
the quarantine headquarters on Grosse Isle in the St. Lawrence River.
However, upon arriving at Quebec City, several of its crew proved to be suf-
fering from the flu and, after unloading, the ship was ordered back to Grosse
Isle for care of the sick and general fumigation on 9 July 1918. By 11 July,
forty six crew members were in the Grosse Isle hospital. By the next morning,
the number had risen to sixty-seven and by nightfall had reached seventy-two.
At approximately the same date, the Nagoya arrived at Montreal and the Med
1099 hospital ship at Halifax, likewise carrying the flu.22
17 Rod Daniels, “In Search of an Enigma: the “Spanish” Lady, Medical Research Council:
National Institute for Medical Research (United Kingdom, 1998), <www.nimr.mrc.ac.uk/mill-
hillessays/1998/influenza1918.htm>.
18 John M. Barry, The Great Influenza: the Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History (New
York: Viking, 2004).
19 Sir Andrew Macphail, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, 1914-1919:
Medical Services (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1925).
20 Janice P Dickin McGinnis, “The Impact of Epidemic Influenza: Canada, 1918-19” Historical
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Dickin McGinnis’ paper has remained the most important source on the origins
of the pandemic in Canada and is cited by most subsequent historians.23
In the Canadian literature, the pandemic is thus seen as a consequence of
the war’s end where the evils of war were brought home to the civilian popula-
tion by soldiers returning from the front. The innocent civilian population was
therefore “contaminated” by the returning soldiers not only with disease but
also with the horror of the trenches. However, this conception of the pandemic
is inconsistent with the evidence.
In July 1918, when the disease was supposed to have arrived in Canada,
the largest and most significant allied offensive of the war, known as the
“Hundred Days Campaign,” was still a month away. Indeed, throughout the
summer of 1918 and until 11 November, the war was increasing in intensity, not
coming to a slow end. Indeed, most of the Canadian soldiers who were over-
seas on 11 November 1918 would not return home until the late spring of
1919.24 However, the disease and the military were intimately linked, just in a
different way than thought.25
23 Other important Canadian works on the pandemic include Jadranka Bacic, The Plague of the
Spanish Flu : the Influenza Epidemic of 1918 in Ottawa (Ottawa: Historical Society of Ottawa,
1999); Robert C Belyk and Diane M Belyk, “No Armistice with Death: The Spanish Influenza,
1918-19,” The Beaver (October-November 1988): 43-9; Roger Delaunais, Le Camp de la
Grippe Espagnole: la Grippe Espagnole dans la Matapédia (Amqui: R. Delaunais, 1991);
Janice Dickin McGinnis, “A City Faces and Epidemic,” Alberta History 4, no. 24 (1976): 1-
11; Ian Millier, “No Cause for Alarm,” The Beaver 6, no. 80 (2002): 33-7; Esyllt Wynne Jones,
“Searching for the Springs of Health: Women and Working Families in Winnipeg’s 1918-1919
Influenza Epidemic” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Manitoba, 2003); Esyllt Wynne Jones,
“Across a Diseased Boundary: Urban Space and Social Interaction During Winnipeg’s
Influenza Epidemic, 1918-1919,” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 13 (2002):
119-39; Margaret Jones, “Epidemic and Health: Influenza in Vancouver, 1918-19,” BC Studies
34 (1977): 21-44; Maureen K Lux, “The Bitter Flats: The 1918 influenza Epidemic in
Saskatchewan,” Saskatchewan History (Spring 1997): 3-12; Yvette Paquin, “Les Soeurs Grises
en Tenue de Service – L’Influenza de 1918,” Cahiers Nicolétains 2, no. 8 (1986): 101-21;
Eileen Pettigrew, The Silent Enemy: Canada and the Deadly Flu of 1918 (Saskatoon: Western
Producer Prairie Books, 1983); Linda Quiney, “‘Filling the Gaps’: Canadian Voluntary Nurses,
the 1917 Halifax Explosion and the Influenza Epidemic of 1918,” Canadian Bulletin of
Medical History 2, no. 19 (2002): 351-373; Denise Rioux, La Grippe Espagnole à Sherbrooke
et dans les Cantons de l’Est, (Sherbrooke: Universite de Sherbrooke, 1993).
24 G.W.L. Nicholson, The Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer,
1962), 497-508.
25 Standard works on Canada and the First World War include Tim Cook, No place to Run: the
Canadian Corps and Gas Warfare in the First World War (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 1999); AF Duguid, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War
1914-1919, Vol. 1, Aug.1914-Sept.1915 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1938);
Desmond Morton, When Your Number’s Up: the Canadian Soldier in the First World War
(Toronto: Random House, 1993); Desmond Morton, Winning the Second Battle: Canadian
Veterans and the Return to Civilian Life, 1915-1930 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1987); Desmond Morton and J.L. Granatstein, Marching to Armageddon: Canadians and the 
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The physical path taken by pandemic influenza in Canada was determined
by the intensification of the war effort, not by its waning. Influenza did not
spread from Europe to Canada with soldiers returning from the trenches during
July 1918. Instead, the disease arrived in Canada from the United States in the
second and third weeks of September with American soldiers on their way
overseas to the battlefields of Europe. Once in Canada, the course taken by the
disease was determined by the extension of the war effort and particularly by
the mobilization of the Canadian Siberian Expeditionary Force. In fact, as pan-
demic influenza became endemic in Canada, the Canadian military placed the
war effort above concerns for civilian public health. Canadian soldiers did not
contaminate civilian society with “the horrors of war,” instead the war effort on
the home front determined the physical path taken by the disease.
The Araguyan, the only ship to arrive in Canada carrying soldiers ill with
influenza during the summer of 1918, sailed into view of Halifax harbour dur-
ing the second week of July. Before the ship could dock, however, Major
General Jones of Military District 6 (Halifax) cabled Dr. F Montizambert, the
Medical Superintendent of the Canadian Quarantine Service, to inform him that
he was holding all soldiers onboard a recently-arrived troopship (despite the
objection of local quarantine officials) as 23 percent of those on board were
infected with the “new variety of influenza”.26 It read:
Ottawa July 8th 1918, Dr. Montizambert c/o Quarantine Officer Halifax NS
Med 1099 Hospital Ship arrived Halifax Sunday with epidemic of new vari-
ety of influenza twentythree [sic] percent affected [sic] stop have instructed
troops to be held aboard ship stop Quarantine Authorities Halifax disclaim any
responsibility respecting troop ships stop this is not according to my under-
standing of your regulations stop desired [sic] to meet you in every way
consider that coordinated action should be taken urgent.27
It appears that some historians misread the military telegram number for the
name of a hospital ship because no ship named Med 1099 was used by the
Canadian, British, or American navies to transport Canadian soldiers during 
the First World War.28 The hospital ship to which this telegram refers was
Great War, 1914-1919 (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, Ltd., 1989); Nicholson, Canadian
Expeditionary Force; Bill Rawling, Death Their Enemy: Canadian Medical Practitioners and
War (Québec: AGMV Marquis, 2001); John Swettenham, To Seize the Victory: The Canadian
Corps in World War I (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1965); Jonathan Vance, Death So Noble:
Memory, Meaning and the First World War (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997).
26 Cable (Med 1099): Major General Jones to Dr. Montizambert, July 8 1918, LAC, RG 29, V
300, File 416-2-12, 
27 Ibid.
28 See records of transports that carried soldiers from Europe to Canada in 1918 in: LAC, RG
150-6, V 345-371.
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instead the HS Araguyan which arrived at Inspection Pier 2 in Halifax on
Sunday 7 July 191829 and was the only ship to arrive at Halifax harbour carry-
ing returning soldiers (sick or healthy) within a week of the date of the
telegram.30 In fact, it was the only ship to arrive in Canada after the middle of
June and before the end of September which carried Canadian soldiers return-
ing from overseas.
After the Llandovery Castle hospital ship was sunk on 27 June 1918 by a
German U-Boat, killing all but 24 of the 258 passengers and crew,31 the
Canadian authorities cancelled all return sailings of both troop ships and hos-
pital ships for an indefinite period of time because no escort craft could be
spared. It should be noted that in the early summer of 1918 the German Army
was at the end of its greatest advance since the onset of static warfare in the
autumn of 1914.32 For this reason every destroyer in service was required to
escort Canadian and American boats conveying soldiers to Europe and could
not be spared for soldiers returning to Canada. As a result, by 18 September
1918, the Adjutant General of the Canadian Expeditionary Force was able to
report to the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of the Overseas Military Forces
of Canada: “the last transport conveying other ranks to Canada sailed on 
22 June 1918 [and] there has been no sailing of a Hospital ship since the sail-
ing of the HS Araguyan on June 26th and consequently the number of [injured
soldiers ready to return] to Canada in the various hospitals has accumulated [to]
over three thousand.”33 This also suggests that neither the Nagoya nor the
Somali could have returned soldiers to Canada. 
Indeed, both ships were scheduled to sail from Montreal for Europe in the
third week of July 1918 with a full complement of soldiers destined for the
trenches. Most of these soldiers were American and were part of a program
which was designed to prevent the loss of fresh troops to enemy u-boats lurk-
ing off the coast of the United States, the intent being to ship them along the
shortest possible route from the Gulf of the St. Lawrence to England rather than
from New York or Boston. Due to disease amongst the crews of these two
ships, no soldiers were even allowed to board either transport. 
On 9 July, a telegram was sent from the Senior Naval Officer at Montreal
to the Secretary of the Department of the Naval Service in Ottawa explaining
the situation of both boats:
29 War Diary (WD) Assistant Director of Medical Services (ADMS), Military District 6
(Halifax), Month of July 1918. LAC, .RG 9, Volume (Vol) 5062, File 978, Part 2.
30 Ibid.
31 MacPhail, 241.
32 See James Edmonds, Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1918, Volumes I - III
(London: Macmillan, 1935).
33 Letter: Adj Gen OMFC to Deputy Minister OMFC, 18 September 1918, LAC, RG 9, Series
(S) III A 1, Vol 84, File 10-11-1 “Demobilization.”
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The Nagoya was scheduled to sail shortly, but was not passed by the American
Embarkation Medical Officer, owing to sickness among the crew. A meeting
was held this morning in reference to the matter, and it was found that out of
a crew of 160 there were 100 cases of influenza. When this vessel passed the
Quarantine Station she reported 6 cases, but was allowed to proceed. It is now
hoped that this vessel will be disinfected and ready to embark her troops at a
later date.
The master of the “Somali” reported at the meeting that 7 of his crew were
down with influenza. The Canadian Medical Officer stated that troops could
not be placed on board until this ship has been disinfected. It is now very
doubtful if she can get the next convoy. The Medical Officers have taken the
case up with the Principal Medical Officer in Ottawa.34
From this telegram it is quite clear that when the Nagoya and the Somali were
detained at Grosse Isle, they were not returning soldiers to Canada. In fact, nei-
ther ship is listed as having carried soldiers from Europe to Canada at all in
1918.35 Instead, their crews were waiting to transport soldiers to Europe: The
Nagoya was waiting to embark American soldiers while the Somali was
assigned to carry Canadians. Upon arriving in Quebec, these ships were empty
(except for crew) and the disease was apparently quarantined by returning the
two vessels to the Grosse Isle quarantine station.36
Quarantine efforts at least appeared successful as by the second week in
August, the federal Director of Public Health was still discussing Spanish Flu
in hypothetical terms, referring to the possibility that it might, in future, be
missed at a quarantine station and could enter Canada.37 This possibility was
made all the more unlikely by Prime Minister Robert Borden who prevented
any soldiers from returning home by any means during the summer of 1918.
Because all sailings of Canadian transports and hospital ships were cancelled in
the summer of 1918, the situation in England for soldiers who were slotted to
go home was understandably troubling from a logistical point of view: as casu-
alties began to mount at the front, fewer and fewer beds were available in
England. In an effort to rectify the situation, the Governor General of Canada,
the Duke of Devonshire, helped Sir Edward Kemp, the Minister of Militia and
34 Memo: W.G. Holloway to Secretary, Department of the Naval Service, 9 July 1918, LAC, RG
29, Vol 300, File 416-2-12.
35 LAC, RG 150-6, Vol 345-371 contains the sailing lists of ships that brought soldiers home
from Canada between 1918 and 1920. Neither the Nagoya or Somali is listed among them.
36 Memo: G.E. Martineau, MD, Office of the Medical Superintendent, Quarantine Service,
Grosse Isle, Quebec to the Acting Deputy Minister of Immigration and Colonization, 12 July
1918, LAC, RG 29, Vol 300, File 416-2-12.
37 Telegram: F. Montizambert to Dr. N.E. MacKay, 9 August 1918, LAC, RG 29, Vol 300, File
416-2-12; Telegram: NE MacKay to Dr. F. Montizambert, 9 August 1918, LAC, RG 29, Vol
300, File 416-2-12.
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Defence, devise a scheme to send both officers and other ranks home on
American transports destined for American ports and onto Canada by rail.38
Plans were put in place to transport several thousand soldiers home in this way
during the summer of 1918. Before their scheme had an impact on the backlog,
however, Prime Minister Borden terminated it through an angry letter to Kemp.
Borden’s objections centred around the fact that it was “impossible to give any
satisfactory explanation to the Canadian people of the failure to use Canadian
ports and the facilities already provided at enormous expense.”39 This meant
that only about 300 soldiers sailed from Europe and Canada, via the United
States, during the summer of 1918 on commercial and privately arranged trans-
ports.40 When this number is compared to the 6,255 men who would eventually
leave England for Canada in the last week of September alone, when sailings
returned to their pre-July levels, the contrast becomes apparent.41
Regardless, while actions were taken to prevent the spread of influenza, the
disease was hardly a primary concern of the Borden government. Indeed, only
when the disease threatened troop shipments did it become a salient issue, and
even then only temporarily. Indirectly, the desire to protect troopships from
German U-Boats may have actually prevented the disease from spreading to
Canada, more out of a concern for the war effort than public health. While the
number of soldiers returning to Canada in July, August, and September 1918
was not so low as to dismiss altogether the possibility that they brought the flu
with them when they entered Canada, the numbers make it unlikely. It would
appear that “Spanish flu” did not become endemic in Canada until the second
week in September 1918. This is supported by military hospital records which
suggest that influenza activity only began to spike only during late September
and early October 1918, well after Borden ended the Devonshire-Kemp scheme
and well before the first mass sailings of injured troops began to reach Canada.
Military hospital records are especially revealing because soldiers could
avoid duty only if they were granted leave (an officially approved and sched-
uled absence) or if they were excused from duty during morning sick parade. If
they were excused from duty while on sick parade, soldiers were usually
required to report to the local camp hospital. It can thus be surmised that a sol-
dier, infected with a virulent influenza virus such as that which prevented the
38 It would appear that as Kemp, the Minister of Militia, did not use official channels to issue his
instructions, he wanted to keep his scheme quiet. This theory is in part confirmed by Borden’s
angry reaction once he discovered the clandestine scheme. For the Governor General’s
telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies see LAC, RG 9, S III A 1, Vol 84, File 10-
11-1 “Demobilization.”
39 Letter: Sir Robert Borden to Sir Edward Kemp, 15 August 1918, LAC, RG 9, S III A 1, Vol
84, File 10-11-1 “Demobilization.”
40 Report: “Quarterly Report: July, August, September 1918” – Quartermaster General’s Branch,
1 October 1918, LAC, RG 9, S III A 1, Vol 54.
41 Ibid.
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sailing of the Nagoya or Somali, would have likely reported to the hospital
either on his own accord or on the orders of his commanding officer as he could
not simply “stay in his bunk.” These military records also offer evidence not
only of the diseases which circulated within the military, but also of the general
state of civilian health during the war. Because the military in Canada was
essentially an organization which turned civilians into soldiers for service over-
seas, during 1918 there was a significant level of interaction between the
civilian and military worlds. Almost every day, civilians arrived at military
camps, either as volunteers for the CEF or because they had been drafted under
the Military Service Act. Once in the military there was ample opportunity for
diseases to pass between civilians and soldiers. Military personnel went on
leave, they visited local towns on evening passes, they attended civic celebra-
tions and functions, and they were actively engaged in recruiting drives.42
Furthermore, soldiers were routinely transported between various towns and
military districts aboard normal civilian passenger trains.43 Essentially, there
were few physical or artificial barriers separating the civilian and military
spheres of life in 1918.
Through an analysis of three hospitals from geographically distinct areas, St.
John Military Hospital, St. Jean, Quebec, the Station Hospital in Kapuskasing,
Ontario, and Victoria Military Hospital, Esquimalt, British Columbia, it becomes
unlikely that an “influenza like” illness was endemic within the Canadian popu-
lation during the spring and summer of 1918.44 Because the viruses and bacteria
that affect the human respiratory system are always in circulation, when examin-
ing hospital records for any period it would be expected that evidence of such
disease activity would be present. During an influenza epidemic or pandemic, the
number of cases admitted to hospital should be higher than what was the “nor-
mal” base disease activity. When looking for evidence of an especially virulent
and infectious virus such as the 1918 flu, it is logical to suggest that large, sus-
tained spikes in the number of admissions for respiratory complaints over several
days or weeks would signify the presence of such a virus in that hospital’s service
area. In fact, however, the presence of such a disease is not evident until late
September and early October in these three hospitals.
42 Even a cursory examination of the war diaries from any military district in Canada kept by the
Quartermaster General, the Assistant Director of Supply and Transport, the Base Depots or
other supporting units bears this analysis out as the diaries record daily activities such as those
described above.
43 Ibid.
44 The term “influenza-like” is used to refer to admissions with diagnoses recorded as influenza,
grippe, cold, flu, bronchitis, catarrh, and sore throat, all conditions that are either euphemisms
for influenza or have similar symptoms. Cases of pneumonia, broncho-pneumonia and lobular
pneumonia were also included as these were the leading causes of death during the pandemic,
and patients were often admitted with these secondary infections alone. Non-contagious con-
ditions like gas inhalation or other respiratory diseases like tuberculosis are not included. 
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During the First World War, St. John Military Hospital serviced the
Canadian Engineers Depot at St. John Barracks, St. Jean Quebec. A study of
this hospital is revealing because recruits from all over Canada, as well as the
United States, moved in and out of the barracks daily and thus the hospital
could expect to see patients who had been exposed to microbes from a wide
array of geographical sources. For this reason we might expect to see evidence
of a highly infectious virus, such as influenza, if it did indeed exist in epidemic
(or pandemic) form in the Canadian population during the spring of 1918.
However, a review of hospital records suggests that this was not the case.
During the winter of 1918 (5 December 1917 to 4 March 1918) “influenza-
like” disease activity remained insignificant. During this 90-day period, 63
patients were admitted to the hospital with influenza-like symptoms, an aver-
age of 0.7 patients per day (a tiny number compared to overall admissions).
During the spring months (5 March to 4 June 1918), 92 people were admitted
to hospital with influenza or influenza-like symptoms, an average of 1.02 per
day. Throughout the summer (5 June 1918 to 4 September 1918), when the dis-
ease is supposed to have arrived at the port of Quebec with soldiers who would
have been funnelled into the military system, the hospital had only 36 admis-
sions for influenza-like diseases, an average of only 0.4 patients per day. When
these numbers are compared to the fall of 1918 (5 September 1918 to 4
December 1918), the contrast becomes apparent (see figure 1). During this
period 245 patients were admitted with influenza-like symptoms, an average of
2.7 patients per day. During this period, 32 people were admitted in one day,
almost the same number as for the entire summer. The number of deaths are
even more revealing: during the winter, spring and summer of 1917-1918, not
one death was recorded for patients with influenza-like symptoms. In contrast,
during the fall of 1918, 21 patients, or nine percent of those admitted, died of
their illness or related complications.45
The Station hospital at Kapuskasing, Ontario, a small town in the vast,
boreal expanse of Northern Ontario, looked after soldiers who were either pass-
ing through on their way across Canada on the railroad or from units which
guarded and serviced the local prisoner of war camp. A study of this hospital is
revealing because it was an important stop on a soldier’s route west or east. As
well, the prisoner of war camp, which housed hundreds of interned enemy
aliens, constantly accepted prisoners from across the country.46 These factors
combined to make the hospital a unique location where people from across
Canada were placed in close proximity in an otherwise isolated environment. 
45 These statistics for St. John Military Hospital are compiled from the hospital admission-dis-
charge books in LAC, RG 9, II L 1, Vol 9, books 291-7.
46 See Bohdan Kordan, Enemy Aliens, Prisoners of War: Internment in Canada During the Great
War (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002).
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Figure 1: Respiratory Cases Admitted to St. Jean Military Hospital 
5 December 1917 – 15 February 1919
Figure 2: Respiratory Cases Admitted to Kapuskasing Station Hospital 
5 December 1917 – 15 February 1919
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During the winter there appears to have been a low rate of admission for
respiratory illness. For the winter months, data is unfortunately available only
for the period 5 February 1918 to 4 March 1918, during which time one soldier
was admitted with influenza-like symptoms. During the spring, activity did
increase: eight soldiers were admitted with similar complaints between 5
March 1918 and 4 June 1918. During the summer, when a number of prisoners
were transferred from Halifax to Kapuskasing, admissions for influenza or sim-
ilar conditions dropped off again to only one soldier during the period 5 June
1918 to 4 September 1918. When these numbers (a total of ten soldiers in seven
months) are compared to the 92 soldiers who were admitted between 5
September 1918 and 4 December 1918, the contrast is evident (see figure 2).
The rate of daily admissions essentially increased from nearly zero to more than
one per day. As well, it is significant that none of the ten soldiers admitted in
the winter, spring and summer died of their illness while four of the 92 suc-
cumbed to the disease, a mortality rate for the autumn of more than 4.3
percent.47
On the west coast of Canada, the course of disease activity was similar.
Victoria Military Hospital, at Esquimalt, British Columbia, was set up to ser-
vice both recruits and Home Service Canadian soldiers. As with Kapuskasing
and St. Jean, little evidence can be found to support a spring or summer epi-
demic of influenza. Between 5 April 1918 and 4 June 1918 (there is no data
available for the winter months), there were only 15 people admitted to the hos-
pital with influenza-like symptoms (less than 0.3 patients per day). During the
summer months (5 June 1918 to 4 September 1918), only 8 soldiers were
admitted with influenza or a similar diagnosis (or approximately 0.09 patients
per day). In comparison, between 5 September 1918 and 4 December 1918, 235
soldiers were admitted to hospital with influenza-like illnesses, of whom 11
died (an admission rate of more than 2.6 per day and a mortality rate of 4.6 per-
cent). Again the contrast is significant (see figure 3).48
If a virulent strain of influenza had been circulating in the Canadian popu-
lation during the spring and summer of 1918, there was little evidence of its
presence in these three hospitals. Although this analysis is far from conclusive,
it does suggest that pandemic influenza was not endemic in Canada in either the
spring or summer of 1918 as each of these hospitals saw patients from a wide
variety of geographical locations. If the disease was not endemic in Canada
during the first nine months of 1918, and if there was little opportunity for the
disease to enter Canada from Europe during the summer, it is possible, and
indeed likely, that the disease spread north from the United States.
47 These statistics for Kapuskasing Station Hospital are compiled from the hospital admission-
discharge books in LAC, RG 9, S II-L-1, Vol 6, book 187.
48 These statistics for Victoria Military Hospital are compiled from the hospital admission-dis-
charge books in: LAC, RG 9, S II-L-1, Vol 18, book 567-8.
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John Barry, an historian of the 1918 pandemic in the United States,49
records that the disease made its first appearance in the United States in Boston
during the last days of August 1918.50 He suggests that by the second week in
September, “Spanish flu” had already spread across Massachusetts and into New
York State.51 All across the north-eastern United States local newspapers reported
that the disease was widespread in the region by the second week of September.
The Marion Daily Star (Ohio), for example, reported on 14 September 1918 that
the disease was prevalent in Newport News and Philadelphia;52 by 15 September
1918, there were thousands of cases of flu among soldiers at Camp Devons in
Massachusetts.53 National borders provide little defence against disease, espe-
cially during wartime. It would appear likely that the disease spread across the
border from the United States to Canada in four separate locations, only weeks
after the most deadly wave began in August. The First World War Polish
49 There are three monographs which chronicle the course of the pandemic in the United States.
The oldest book is Richard Collier, The Plague of the Spanish Lady: The Influenza Pandemic
of 1918-1919 (New York: Atheneum, 1974). The most recent text is Barry (cited above).
However the best and most scholarly account remains Alfred W. Crobsy, America’s Forgotten
Pandemic: the influenza of 1918 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
50 Barry, 192-3.
51 Ibid, 197-9.
52 “Influenza is Now Spreading,” The Marion Daily Star (Ohio), 14 September 1918, 9.
53 “2000 Cases of Influenza Found Among Soldiers”, the Syracuse Herald (Syracuse, New
York), 15 September 1918, 11.
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Figure 3: Respiratory Cases Admitted to Victoria Military Hospital 
5 December 1917 – 15 February 1919
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infantry camp at Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario was one of the first two places
in Canada to become infected with the influenza virus.54
In September of 1917, the Canadian government agreed to set up a sepa-
rate training camp to house Polish citizens who were recruited for the French
Army in the United States.55 Although administered by Canadian soldiers and
supplied by the Canadian army, the camp was essentially a semi-autonomous
entity within the Canadian military. Between September 1917 and the end of
the war, more than 22,000 Polish recruits (99% of whom were from the United
States) were trained at Niagara-on-the-Lake and sent to France to serve in the
French army.56 Because the camp recruited almost exclusively in the United
States, it is not surprising that the virus appears to have arrived in the camp with
American recruits on 13 September 1918.57 Over the next several months, hun-
dreds of soldiers fell ill and, out of a total strength of 2,500 men, 24 soldiers
died.
The disease also struck on the same day in Victoriaville, Quebec, a small
town east of Montreal in the heart of the Eastern Townships. Again, it is most
likely that the disease arrived in the town with visitors from the United States
who were attending a Eucharistic Congress. Le Devoir reported on 13
September 1918 that “les grandes fêtes du Congrès Eucharistique sont com-
mencés depuis hier soir et tout fait présager que ces fêtes seront belles à tous
les points de vue.”58
Both the first cases and the first fatalities of Spanish Flu in the town were
recorded among the priests and students at a Victoriaville boys’ boarding
54 It has been suggested elsewhere that the RAF training base at Hamilton Ontario was the first
place to be infected with influenza in Canada. This is largely based on a memo written by the
Officer Commanding Brant Military Hospital on 30 September 1918 (LAC, RG 24, Vol 4270,
File 15-2-73, Volume 1) which in Part reads, “During the night of Thursday Aug. 26th, we
received at the Hamilton Military Hospital seven cases of influenza that had suddenly devel-
oped in the RAF Armament School, Hamilton, where they have about 600 men on their
strength.” However, the letter is an urgent plea for help and it is clear from the subsequent
paragraphs that “Aug. 26” is typographical error and that “Sept. 26” was the date intended by
the officer. This is borne out by the War diary for Military District 2 which records the out
break in the last week of September and makes no mention of the disease in August 1918
(LAC, RG 9, Vol 5059, Part 1). As well, the 26 August 1918 was a Monday and the 26 of
September 1918 was a Thursday.
55 Telegram: Department of Militia and Defence to General Officer Commanding Camp Borden
Ontario (Military District 8), 22 September 1917. LAC, RG 24, Vol 4401, File 34-7-215. The
only account in the historiography that examines the creation of a Polish Army in Canada is
M.B. Biskupski, “Canada and the Creation of a Polish Army, 1914-1918,” The Polish Review
XLIV (3): 339-380.
56 Report: Lt. Col. A.T. LePan, Commandant, Polish Army Camp, Niagara-on-the-Lake to the
Chief of the General Staff, Department of Militia and Defence, 22 March 1919. LAC, RG 24,
Vol 1883A, File: Polish Army Camp.
57 Ibid.
58 Unnamed Correspondent, “Au Congres de Victoriaville,” Le Devior, 13 September 1918, 1.
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school, le Collège Sacré Coeur, only hours after the end of the Eucharistic
Congress on 16 September 1918.59 As Le Devoir reported, the school had
played a key role in the Congress: “à huit heurs a eut lieu la messe d’exposition
de Saint-Sacrement, et à 10 heurs eut lieu, à l’Académie, la messe pontificale,
chantée par Sa Grandeur Mgr. Brunault.”60 The seminary in neighbouring
Nicolet was also hit hard by the pandemic after it participated in the
Congress.61 By 25 September L’Acadien reported that the seminary students, as
well as nuns at the neighbouring Catholic convent, were under quarantine.62
Given that the college, the convent, and seminary had all actively participated
in the Eucharistic Congress, it would appear that the disease spread outward
from this location. It would also seem most likely that the disease came north
from the United States with American Catholic parishioners and clergy who
visited the Congress.
The Congress, which began on 12 September and ended on 16 September,
attracted more than 25,000 people to the small town.63 While it is impossible to
definitively trace where these visitors came from, newspaper articles offer
some clues. Le Devoir reported “Tout les paroissiens de la ville et un grand
nombre d’étrangers assistaient à cette messe.”64 While the exact meaning of
“étrangers” is unclear (the word can be alternately defined as “foreigners” or
“outsiders”), the phrase may indicate that visitors came from international des-
tinations, which in this case, would likely have meant the United States. This
would appear probable as in 1910 several dozen American priests and bishops
attended the Eucharistic Congress held in Montreal, a number that does not
include any lay attendees who might have been part of the American delega-
tion.65 Likewise, Quebec bishops and priests often travelled to the United
States to attend important Catholic events, even during the 1918 influenza pan-
demic.66
On 20 September 1918, the first Canadian soldiers began to contract the
disease. At the Station Hospital in St. Jean Quebec, soldiers from the local engi-
59 L’Action Catholique, 24 Septembre 1918, 1.
60 Unnamed Correspondent, “Au Congres de Victoriaville,” Le Devior, 13 September 1918, 1.
While the term “académie” is ambiguous in that it could refer to a variety of educational insti-
tutions, the familiar usage of the word implies that readers would be able to identify the
institution. As le College Sacrée Coeur was the only sizable Catholic educational institution in
the city it is logical to assume that this is the “académie” to which the article refers.
61 “Les Fetes de Victoriaville,” Le Devoir, 16 September 1918, 1.
62 “La Grippe Espagnole,” L’Acadien, 1 October 1918, 1.
63 “Les Fetes de Victoriaville,” Le Devoir, 16 September 1918, 1
64 “Au Congres de Victoriaville,” Le Devior, 13 September 1918, 1.
65 J. Castell Hopkins, The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1910 (n.p.: Toronto, 1911),
pp 351-358.
66 Cardinal Bégin, the archbishop of Quebec, attended both the Eucharistic Congress at
Victoriaville and, a few days later, the funeral of Cardinal Farley of New York state. “Final
Honours Today to Cardinal Farely,” New York Times, 24 September 1918, 13.
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neers depot began reporting sick with the flu.67 The Assistant Director of
Medical Services (ADMS) for Military District 4 (Montreal), Lieutenant-
Colonel F.S. Patch recorded in the district war diary that the “epidemic [was]
probably brought to St. Johns [sic] by recruits from the United States, probably
Boston, where the epidemic [was] raging.”68 By 25 September 1918 the disease
also began to appear in Montreal.69
The last locus of infection was Sydney, Nova Scotia. On 20 September 1918
an American Transport, the SS Nestor, which sailed from New Jersey on 17
September 1918 carrying American soldiers to France,70 arrived in Sydney and
anchored around noon. While no cases of influenza were reported when the ves-
sel weighed anchor at Hoboken, three days later over 150 men were severely ill
with the disease and it was deemed necessary to put them ashore.71 Due to rough
seas, however, the disembarkation was delayed until 22 September 1918,72 by
which time the number of sick had grown to more than 50073 necessitating that
all 660 soldiers be removed from the ship.74 These soldiers, who were admitted
to the Moxham-Ross Military Hospital in Sydney, overwhelmed the small facil-
ity, forcing authorities in Halifax to begin intense efforts to ship supplies and
supporting personnel to the small mining community.75
From this evidence, it appears that influenza spread to Canada from the
United States during the last weeks of September 1918. While the disease and
the military had a significant relationship, it was different than is often thought.
At Niagara-on-the-Lake, St. Jean, and Sydney, influenza had arrived in Canada
with American military recruits on their way to support the allied offensive in
Europe. While the disease would have arrived in Canada at sometime in 1918,
troop movements designed to further the war effort determined both the
chronology and locations of infection. Once pandemic influenza entered the
country, the war effort continued to determine the course taken by the disease.
Indeed, the mobilization of the Siberian Expeditionary Force (SEF) was the
greatest single factor in the diffusion of the disease.
67 War Diary, Assistant Director of Medical Services, Military District 4 (Montreal), 20
September 1918. LAC, RG 9, Vol 5061, File 976, Part 1.
68 Ibid, 21 September 1918.
69 Ibid, 25-26 September 1918.
70 Memo: From the port of E. Hoboken, New Jersey, United States of American to Chief of 
E.S. (?) “Cross Reference Record”, 23 September 1918, National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA), Washington, DC, RG 92, Entry 2023. 
71 Report: Lt. Col. Edward A Pitzka, Chief Surgeon SS Nestor, 2 October 1918. NARA, RG 92,
Entry 2023.
72 War Diary, Assistant Director of Medical Services Military District 6 (Halifax), 22 September
1918. LAC, RG 9, Vol 5062, File 978, Part 3.
73 Ibid.
74 Report: Lt. Col. Edward A Pitzka
75 Ibid.
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When civil war had erupted in Russia in 1917, the Allied powers supported
the “White” Russian forces (those forces loyal to Tsar Nicholas II) in the hope
that an eastern front could again be established against Germany and to try to
prevent Russian supplies from falling into the hands of Germany.76 While the
United States and Britain supplied significant numbers of troops, Canada was
also asked to furnish an expeditionary force of 2,700 men. Accordingly, on 12
August 1918, it was decided that two battalions of infantry, a field artillery
brigade, a machine gun company, and ancillary troops would be sent to Siberia.
These troops began assembling in various areas across the country in the last
weeks of August and first weeks of September 1918. Ultimately, these troops
were intended to converge at Vancouver, BC where they would be shipped
across the Pacific, first to Japan and then on to Russia.77
Soldiers for the SEF were drawn from all parts of the country, including
areas already infected with “Spanish Flu.” On the morning of 27 September
1918 recruits for the SEF at Sussex Camp, New Brunswick began their journey
to Vancouver where they were to board the Empress of Japan for the voyage to
Russia.78 On the very day they departed, the first cases of influenza were
reported at Sussex Camp.79 Before the train reached Montreal the first cases of
influenza developed on board forcing authorities to remove Pte. R.E. Hickie
and Pte. F.E. Vincent, who were severely ill, to hospitals in Montreal.80 At the
same time, elsewhere in the city, 42 soldiers (mostly medical personnel)
boarded what was most likely the same train to join the SEF on their journey
westwards despite the fact that they had been in contact with flu victims.81 This
was the beginning of what would become a pattern.
As soldiers travelling west from points east of Vancouver became sick en
route, they were removed from troop trains along the way and deposited in
local hospitals. This same scenario was played out repeatedly across the west.
In Winnipeg, sick soldiers coming from eastern Canada (quite likely from
Sussex Camp in New Brunswick) were transferred from SEF troop trains to a
local military hospital on 28 September 1918.82 The next night “C” Company
76 Nicholson, 490.
77 Ibid.
78 Telegram: GOC Military District 7 (St. John) to Quartermaster General, Ottawa, 26 September
1918. LAC, RG 24, Vol 4574, File 3-9-47, Volume 2.
79 War Diary, Assistant Director of Medical Services Military District 7 (St. John), 28 September
1918. LAC, RG 9, Vol 5063, File 978, Part 1.
80 Memo: District Records Officer Military District 4 to District Records Officer MILITARY
DISTRICT 7, 7 November 1918. LAC, RG 24, Vol 4574, File 3-9-47, Volume 1; Note: to
Assistant Director of Medical Services Military District 7 from (District Records Officer), 27
November 1918. LAC, RG 9, Vol 4574, File 3-9-47, Volume 1.
81 War Diary, Assistant Director of Medical Services Military District 4, 29 September 1918.
LAC, RG 9, Vol 5061, File 976, Part 1.
82 Letter: Acting Provost Marshall Military District 10 (Winnipeg) to the District Casualty
Officer Military District 10, undated. LAC, RG 24, Vol 4607, File MD10-20-102, Volume 1.
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of the 260th Battalion (Canadian Rifles, Siberia) entrained at Regina. When the
train left at 11:45 pm both the District Quartermaster and the commander of the
Saskatchewan SEF draft recorded that the soldiers entrained without incident
and without any apparent illness.83 However, by 4:00 am the next morning,
when the train reached Calgary, 12 soldiers were taken off and admitted to an
“Isolation Hospital”, dangerously sick with the flu.84 Accordingly, the ADMS
of Military District 11 (Victoria) received a wire that influenza was prevalent
on board the troop train that would soon arrive in his district.85 When “C”
Company arrived in Vancouver on 2 October 1918, it brought with it the first
cases of influenza to the west coast.86 While influenza would have inevitably
and unquestionably spread west, the Canadian Military exacerbated the prob-
lem so that the disease erupted in Vancouver before it hit many of the major
population centres in eastern Canada.87
This evidence points to a subtle but important distinction: the soldiers who
spread the disease west were not injured soldiers returning home from the
muddy battlefields of Europe but were new recruits bound for a new front in
Asia. This is significant because soldiers only returned home when wars ended
or when they could no longer be of service to the war effort. Instead, the phys-
ical path that the disease took in Canada was a direct consequence of the
widening of Canada’s commitment to the Great War. Like an invading army
ravaging a foreign country, recruits from the SEF spread disease to the towns
they passed through on their way west. Rather than bringing the horror of the
trenches home from the war through a random dispersal of returning soldiers,
the mobilization of the SEF defined the physical path taken by disease.
Obviously, the disease was not deliberately spread by the Canadian military, but
the movements of the soldiers were intentional, calculated movements designed
83 War Diary, Assistant Adjutant General and Quartermaster General Military District 12
(Regina), 29 September 1918. LAC, RG 9, Vol 5065, File 988; War Diary, 1st Depot Battalion
Saskatchewan Regiment, 29 September 1918. LAC, RG 9, Vol 5065, File 988. The Assistant
Director of Medical Services, Military District 12 makes no mention of illness amongst the
troops in his war diary either.
84 Telegram 78: Assistant Director of Medical Services Military District 12 (Calgary) to Director
General Medical Services, Ottawa, 2 October 1918. LAC, RG 24, Vol 1992, File HW 762-11-
15.
85 War Diary, Assistant Adjutant General in charge of administration Military District 11
(Victoria), 1 October 1918. LAC, RG 9, Vol 5065, File 990, Part 1.
86 The Assistant Director of Medical Services for Military District 11 explicitly states: “First case
of Spanish influenza appeared in district in advance company of Siberian Expeditionary Force.
Hospital opened this date at Coquitlum for this type of case.” War Dairy, Assistant Director of
Medical Services Military District 11 (Victoria), 3 October 1918. LAC, RG 9, Vol 5065, File
990, Part 1.
87 For example, influenza didn’t strike Halifax until later in the first week of October 1918 or
London until the day after it arrived in Vancouver. Even as the disease reached Vancouver,
Toronto was still relatively free from infection.
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to further the war effort. As the disease took its course, however, some military
officials began to take actions that went against the directives of local public
health officials and the conventional understanding of influenza at the time.
Conventional wisdom as to the nature of the illness was divided in 1918.
Some doctors believed that the disease was caused by Pfeiffer’s Bacillus, a bac-
terium that had been found during the 1891 pandemic of influenza.88 On the
other hand, some doubted that bacteria was responsible at all and that any bac-
terial infections that occurred with influenza were merely secondary to the
actual influenza infection which they thought may have been caused by a yet
undiscovered viral agent.89 There was greater consensus among doctors, how-
ever, in so far as the treatment and prevention of influenza was concerned. 
Schools and theatres in almost every community in Canada were closed
for the duration of the pandemic.90 In Montreal, churches were closed for sev-
eral weeks in October.91 In the rest of the province of Quebec, the number of
hours a business could operate each day were reduced and all public gather-
ings were banned.92 In Ottawa all sports and social gatherings, including the
annual Ottawa-McGill football game, were cancelled.93 In Toronto, hotels
were expropriated for use as hospitals, which meant that carpets and beds were
ripped out and burned to stop the spread of the disease,94 and despite the cold
autumn temperatures, the windows of all streetcars were locked open so as to
air out the cars. In Winnipeg, the University was closed, and public gatherings
of any kind were banned. A fifty dollar fine was levied against anyone caught
spitting on the streets of Winnipeg, and at railway stations across the province,
citizens were not allowed to approach passenger trains for fear that the disease
would travel along the rail lines to other communities.95 In Alberta, it was
made a criminal offence to walk outdoors without wearing a gauze mask.96
The consensus among doctors was that quarantine, vaccination, and the use
of gauze masks were the best ways to combat the spread of the disease and
these methods were adopted during the epidemic in nearly every city.97 Within
88 “Bacteriology of the ‘Spanish Influenza,’ The Lancet 10 August 1918, 177.
89 A Geoffrey Shera, “The influenza Epidemic of spring 1915: With special Reference to
Anomalous Throat Signs” The Lancet 29 March 1917, 452.
90 See The Globe (Toronto), 2 October 1918, 5; The Globe (Toronto), 14 October 1918, 3;
Montreal Star, 26 September 1918, 1.
91 Ibid.
92 See Pettigrew, 15-16.
93 The Globe, 14 October 1918.
94 Pettigrew, 15-16.
95 Ibid.
96 The best description of the methods used to combat the spread of the disease (some sound and
some not so sound) can be found in Pettigrew, 15-18.
97 See Manitoba Free Press, 25 September 1918, 1; Montreal Star, 27 September 1918, 1; the
Perth Courier, 11 October 1918, p 7; Vancouver Daily Sun, 7 October 1918, 1; Edmonton
Journal, 4 October 1918, 1.
255
THE HORROR AT HOME: THE CANADIAN MILITARY AND THE “GREAT”
INFLUENZA PANDEMIC OF 1918
chajournal2005.qxd  12/29/06  8:13 AM  Page 255
the Canadian military similar measures were employed. Canadian doctors serv-
ing in England, began issuing policy directives relating to influenza that echoed
those measures put in place by their civilian counterparts in Canada. A bulletin
issued by the Assistant Director of Medical Services, England, suggested that
spitting be prohibited, that smoking in huts be eliminated, that men be encour-
aged to report sick as soon as they felt slightly ill to avoid contact cases, that
any hut in which influenza occurred be quarantined, and that daily temperature
parades be used to detect any men with fevers who failed to report to camp hos-
pitals.98 In many parts of Canada local military officials began to take similar
action soon after the epidemic began. In Niagara-on-the-Lake, the use of gauze
masks by all patients who were even suspected of having influenza was
impressed upon medical officers99 and the importance of quarantine was
emphasized.100 The General Officer Commanding instructed that all suspect
cases be isolated along with contacts. All leave was cancelled and all soldiers
transferring into the district were required to undergo a period of quarantine.101
The Globe even reported on 12 October 1918 that the “Academy of Medicine,
Medical Officers of Health and Military [are] in Accord on Measures [to be]
Taken” and that they had agreed to work together in combating the disease.102
It is clear that many military and civilian officials agreed on the methods
required to combat the disease. However, cooperation between the military and
their civilian counterparts was far from standard practice and some officials
treated public health and the war effort as oppositional concerns.
The war effort included more than the accumulation and movement of
troops. During the First World War, Canadian industry, agriculture and society
were almost entirely geared towards winning the war. Citizen-run patriotic
organizations assisted in recruiting and fund raising while the government con-
tinued to fund the conflict through the sale of war bonds. In the autumn of 1918,
98 Circular Letter 15: Assistant Director of Medical Services Canadian Headquarters, Bramshott
to All Medical Officers and Medical Units, 4 October 1918. LAC, RG 9, Vol 1776, File D-7-
14, Volume l 2. This circular is typical of instructions issued to medical officers serving in
Europe. For other such statements of policy see Memo: “Influenza”, Witly Camp, 22 June
1918. LAC, RG 9, Vol 1776, File D-6-14, Volume 1; Memo: “Epidemic of Influenza 15th
Reserve Battalion” Assistant Director of Medical Services Bramshott, 1 October 1918. LAC,
RG 9, Vol 1776, File D-7-14, Volume 2. Especially Circular Letter 26: “Details to Canada and
Influenza Precautions”, Director General Medical Services, England, 13 November 1918.
LAC, RG 9, Vol 1776, File D-7-14, Volume 2.
99 Memo: Assistant Director of Medical Services Military District 2 to OC Polish Camp Hospital,
6 October 1918. LAC, RG 24, C 4270, File 15-2-73, Volume 1.
100 Memo: AAG to Assistant Director of Medical Services Military District 2, 7 October 1918.
LAC, RG 24, Vol 4270, File 15-2-73, Volume 1.
101 Ibid.
102 The Globe 12 October 1918, 8.
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however, the activities that sustained the war effort came into sharp conflict
with the interests of public health.103
On the night of 1 October 1918 in the city of Winnipeg, the doctor in
charge of the Manitoba Military Hospital furnished patients with free tickets for
a public lecture titled “the Fighting Sixth Battalion in France” in a public audi-
torium in the heart of the city. Streetcar transportation was arranged for the
event.104 This step was undertaken despite warnings from public health offi-
cials to avoid public gatherings and despite the likelihood that these patients
had been in contact with some of the flu victims taken off the SEF troop trains
several days before. Such lectures were, however, important “morale boosters”
for the home front and the presence of wounded veterans who had served in
France would surely have added to the patriotic lure of the event. Likewise, on
5 October, again in Winnipeg, one hundred patients of the Manitoba Military
Hospital were taken on an “outing” to the town of Selkirk where they “were
met by the Mayor and other prominent citizens.”105 By this time the disease
was beginning to become endemic in the city and would, in all probability, have
already made serious in-roads at the military hospital. But again, the hospital
authorities seemed to believe that the benefits of an outing to a public, patriotic
event outweighed the potential risks. Even if “day trips” were deemed an indis-
pensable part of hospital treatment, these trips did not have to include
participation in public events. Indeed, the director of the military hospital was
aware that such gatherings could be dangerous. The director of the military hos-
pital recorded on 13 October:
Complying with the proclamation of the city and Provincial Health
Department, and on Command of the General Officer Commanding, MD 10,
that no gatherings of a public nature be held, as a preventative of the spread-
ing of influenza, known as Spanish influenza throughout the City, no church
service was held at Tuxedo [military hospital] today.106
Only four days later, however, a public, patriotic concert was given by the
“Winnipeg Entertainers” in the hospital.107 Again, the war effort, or activities
that were seen to foster support for it, went on regardless of official or unoffi-
cial concerns about public health. This was, in many ways, typical of the
actions of the Canadian military during the pandemic.
103 See Desmond Morton, Fight or Pay: Soldier’s Families in the Great War (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2004).
104 War Diary, Manitoba Military Hospital, Military District 10, 1 October 1918. LAC, RG 9, Vol
5065, File 988.
105 Ibid, 5 October 1918.
106 Ibid, 13 October 1918.
107 Ibid, 17 October 1918.
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In Montreal, with the epidemic in full swing, one hundred and two enlisted
men and four officers were dispatched from barracks to the city of Montreal
proper in order to assist the local officials responsible for administering the
Military Service Act (conscription) in searching door to door for “slackers”
who had failed to report for duty when drafted under the Military Services Act
(Conscription Act).108 This highly visible action was taken after health author-
ities banned public religious services and closed schools in the city in an effort
to contain the outbreak of the disease. In a similar display, 33 soldiers from the
engineers depot at St. Jean, Quebec were transferred to the city of Montreal in
the middle of October to act as an honour guard in the funeral of the Lieutenant
Governor of Quebec.109 This transfer occurred despite the fact that many of
these soldiers would have likely been exposed to influenza at St. Jean, a bar-
racks which, by order of the Assistant Director of Medical Services for the
district, was under quarantine.110 While there is no explanation in the docu-
ments to suggest why it was deemed necessary to use soldiers from an infected
barracks for the ceremony, it would again appear that the military put its own
concerns ahead of public health.111 Indeed, it was in Quebec that the conflict
between local officials and the Canadian military came to a head.
On 31 October 1918 the Government of Quebec passed a resolution which
read:
Whereas the transport of conscripts is the cause of the dissemination of
influenza and is also dangerous to the conscripts themselves as well as to the
localities to which why are taken. The Central Board of Health demands that
no transport of conscripts shall be made during the prevalent epidemic. This
to include absentees without leave.112
While the political motivations of the anti-conscription Quebec government
might have been obvious, they forced the Canadian military to confront the
issue of public health jurisdiction head on. The General Officers Commanding
both Military Districts 4 and 5 (Montreal and Quebec City) refused to comply
with the government’s orders and suggested that the provincial government did
not have the authority to make such a resolution enforceable under Canadian
108 War Diary, 4th Battalion Canadian Garrison Regiment, Military District 4, 9 October 1918.
LAC, RG 9, Vol 5061, File 976, Part 1.
109 War Diary, Assistant Adjutant General, Military District 4, 21 October 1918.  LAC, RG 9, Vol
5061, File 976, Part 1.
110 Ibid.
111 Indeed, the military in Montreal continued to provide “firing Parties” for funerals throughout
the pandemic despite bans on public gatherings and the possibility of spreading infection to
civilians and visa versa.
112 Letter:  Deputy Minister of Militia and Defence to Deputy Minister of Department of Justice,
31 October 1918.  LAC, RG 13, Vol 1939, File 2362-1918.
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law. Consequently, the matter was forwarded to the office of the Deputy
Minister of Militia and Defence who promptly turned to the Ministry of Justice
for advice. The Deputy Minister of Justice confirmed on 5 November 1918 that
the provincial government did not have the authority to enforce such a resolu-
tion.113 Even if this decision was made to thwart a policy of the Quebec
Government that was designed to circumvent the Military Service Act, the
Deputy Minister placed the interests of the military ahead of concerns for pub-
lic health.
The fact that the war effort would take precedence over public health is
perhaps not surprising. After all, the objective of the Canadian military was to
win the war, not regulate the spread of infectious disease. However the conflict
between the war effort and public health is significant. It not only highlighted
the absence of a federal department of health, but it also illustrated the degree
to which Canadian society was militarized in 1918. In many ways, the
Canadians who died as a result of the pandemic were just as much victims of
the war as of infectious disease. While influenza would have inevitably ravaged
Canada just as it did other countries that were not even involved in the war,
both the chronology and physical path of the pandemic were largely determined
by decisions made by the Canadian military that were designed to further the
war effort.
During the summer of 1918, the need to maximize the transfer of new men
to Europe helped to ensure that, if pandemic influenza was endemic in Europe,
that it was not transferred back to Canada. In the autumn, however, the ship-
ment of soldiers overseas brought the disease into Canada from the United
States. As Canada widened the war effort to include an expeditionary force to
Siberia, the disease was spread across Canada. When the disease became
endemic, again military concerns took precedence over those of local and
regional officials.
The tendency of historians to write about the pandemic as a disease that
was the manifestation of all that was horrible, painful, and disturbing about the
trenches of the First World War has obscured the conflict between public health
and the war effort. In the traditional interpretation, the soldiers are seen to have
brought the war home with them when they returned from the battlefields of
Europe. However, the disease was not spread to Canada in the summer of 1918
by soldiers returning from the trenches who had no choice but to go home once
the conflict was over. Instead, it was spread by the military policy itself as
Canada tried to extend the war effort by mobilizing a new force to fight in
Russia. In this way the physical path traced by the disease was determined by
the widening of the war effort, not by its waning. The pandemic thus was less
113 Letter:  Deputy Minister of Justice to Deputy Minister of Militia and Defence, 5 November
1918.  LAC, RG 13, Vol 1939, File 2362-1918.
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a symbol of the horror of the trenches than it was a reminder of the degree to
which the Great War was a total war where the casualties of deliberate military
action could mount even on the home front. 
* * *
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